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“Odors have a power of persuasion
stronger than that of words,
appearances, emotions, or will. The
persuasive power of an odor cannot
be fended off, it enters into us like
breath into our lungs, it fills us up,
imbues us totally. There is no
remedy for it.”
– Patrick Su¨skind, Perfume: The
Story of a Murderer
1 Introduction
Olfaction is an evolutionarily primitive sense critical for survival across the animal king-
dom. Although in humans it is considered less important for survival when compared to
other senses like the visual or the auditory sense, the human olfactory repertoire is vast and
able to detect millions of airborne odorants at small concentrations (Hoover, 2010). Odor-
ants can exert powerful behavioral effects even at the subconscious level by mediating, for
example, the synchronization of menstrual cycles for females (Stern and McClintock, 1998).
There are good reasons to believe that scents may exert a powerful impact on behavior.
The fragrance industry exists because of the widespread assumption that pleasant fragrances
enhance attractiveness and therefore our social interactions.1 In the marketing literature a
popular quote attributed to Lindstrom (2005) has been used almost like a doctrine whenever
it is deemed necessary to highlight the importance of the olfactory sense. The quote can
be found in various forms and often reads as ‘. . . 83% of all commercial communication
appeals only to one sense — our eyes. And yet, according to studies, 75% of our day-
to-day emotions are influenced by what we smell’.2 This mismatch between olfactory and
visual cues has sparked the development of a ‘scent marketing’ field. The psychology field
has also shown prompt attention in studying the effect of scents on psychology relevant
1Sorokowska et al. (2016) have shown that ratings of body odor attractiveness and pleasantness were
significantly lower in a natural body odor treatment than in a body odor with fragrance use treatment,
which supports the assumption that first impression judgments can be affected by cosmetic use. Dematte`
et al. (2007) showed that female subjects rated a series of male faces as being significantly less attractive in
the presence of an unpleasant odor than in the presence of a pleasant odor. Similarly, Baron’s (1981) results
indicate that male participants rated as more attractive female confederates in the presence of a perfume.
2The quote is likely a compilation of two phrases from Lindstrom’s (2005) book, one that appears in the
front flap and reads: ‘Research shows that a full 75 percent of our emotions are in fact generated by what
we smell’ and a second phrase which appears in page 83 and reads: ‘83 percent of the information people
retain has been received visually’.
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decision making phenomena. Although the effects of olfactory cues on behavior have been
predominantly examined in the marketing and psychology fields, the behaviors typically
examined (discussed momentarily) are of primary interest to economists as well.
Economists are often worried about the (experimental) methods used in the marketing
or psychology field and take such results with a grain of salt. In this paper we bring such
prominent results under the scrutiny of the experimental economics lens. We use a very
simple experimental design with two treatments: in one of the treatments we use a dispenser
to diffuse a scent in the laboratory and the other is a scentless control treatment. More
specifically we evaluate the effect of a citrus scent on two economic domains that scents
might exert a powerful influence: willingness-to-pay (WTP) and choice under risk.
WTP and other measures of economic value have been a fruitful research area in academia.
The appeal of this research agenda is shared by business and corporations which are eager in
developing an understanding of factors that affect consumers’ WTP that may lead to better
pricing decisions. Many companies are now heavily investing in their air design by hiring spe-
cialists to develop customized fragrances and by installing complex scent-dispensing systems.
One of the implicit assumptions is that by making a store environment distinct (e.g., creating
a corporate identity) and pleasant, it will affect consumers’ spending by shifting their WTP
curve. Therefore, WTP elicitation is a relevant and important domain for examining scent
effects.
With respect to risk, our study is motivated by a popular belief that casinos are using
scents to get people to gamble more.3 A paper often cited to back up these claims is an early
study by Hirsch (1995) which conducted a field experiment in the casino floor of a large hotel
in Las Vegas. Over a weekend, two slot machine areas were scented with different fragrances
and higher revenues were observed when compared with weekend days before and after the
scent treatment days.
Even if we accept the effect in the Hirsch (1995) study as genuine (in the next section we
highlight a few problems with this study) there are questions that remain open about the
possible mechanisms that may have driven this particular result. One way by which scents
could have affected revenues in the casino, is by attracting a larger group of people in the
slot machine area. This explanation would relate to the pleasantness of the encompassing
atmosphere. A second explanation is that the scent directly affected individual behavior
by making subjects spent more money per spin. This explanation could be rationalized
by a direct effect on subjects’ risk aversion. Our laboratory experiment rules out the first
explanation since the scent is diffused only after subjects have accepted our invitation to
3This belief is maintained by blogs or news sites with provocative titles such as ‘How Casinos Use Design
Psychology to Get You to Gamble More’ or ‘Casinos Using Scents To Keep People Gambling’.
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attend the lab session. We then directly observe whether the scent treatment induces a
different risk choice pattern by asking subjects to make choices in lottery choice tasks.
In brief, our results confirm that a citrus scent does exert a statistically and economically
significant effect on WTP. We observe some differences between a food and a non-food item
which we explain in terms of congruency of the (fruity) citrus scent with the food product.
For risk, we find no significant effect of scent on subjects risk aversion. This null result is
sensitive to what decision theory and noise story one is ready to accept governing subjects’
risk choices, however, it is a null result for our best fitting model.
In what follows we first start with a literature review to set the context of our research
questions. In section 3 we describe our experimental design, the scent selection and scent
diffusion processes in detail. In section 4 we provide more details with respect to theory and
econometrics of risk choice data. We next present results for WTP and choice under risk
separately, and conclude in the last section.
2 Literature review
To set the context, we first review the relevant literature in this section. We focus on re-
search that examines scent effects on antecedents of WTP such as attitudes toward products
and purchase intentions, on actual WTP or money spent on products and on choice behavior
under risk. By design, our literature review only touches upon the aforementioned issues.
For more general reviews of the literature on ambient scents with marketing applications see
Bradford and Desrochers (2009).
2.1 Attitudes, product evaluations and purchase intention
One strand of the literature that explores the effect of scents on decision making, elicits
the effect of scents on antecedents of WTP like attitudes and evaluations and not the effect of
scents on WTP per se. In one of the first influential studies of olfactory behavioral research,
Spangenberg et al. (1996) examined the effect of an ambient scent in a simulated store envi-
ronment constructed in a consumer behavior laboratory. They used a 2 (scent affect: neutral
vs. pleasing) × 3 (scent intensity: low, medium, high) experimental design with a control
(no scent) condition and had significantly pretested a variety of olfactory stimuli that would
classify as affectively neutral or affectively pleasing to be used in their treatments. In the
simulated store, the product items were selected not to emit any detectable scents: kitchen
items, decor items (e.g., nonfloral plants, fans, calendars, framed posters), clothing with the
university insignia, books, school supplies, and outdoor athletic gear. The authors measured
4
a variety of outcomes like evaluations of the store, evaluations of the merchandise, intention
to visit the store, purchase intention, number of products examined etc. Their results showed
that exposure to different pleasant odors (as compared to the no scent condition) led to more
positive evaluations of the shop’s atmosphere and interior as well as to product evaluations.
Subjects also perceived spending less time shopping than subjects in the unscented condition
(although they actually spent the same amount of time in the store) and a higher probability
of revisiting the store in the future.
Many later studies based their experimental designs on Spangenberg et al. (1996). For
example, Morrin and Ratneshwar (2000) examined the effect of a pleasant geranium ambient
scent by varying on a within-subjects design brand familiarity (i.e., subjects were shown
well known brands and unfamiliar brands). They found that the scent condition improved
product evaluations of brands as well as brand recall but more so for the unfamiliar brands.
Douce´ and Janssens (2013) conducted experiments over two consecutive weeks. In the second
week, a pleasant ambient scent (described as a ‘slightly minty lemon scent’) was diffused in a
prestigious clothing store in Belgium while the first week served as the unscented condition.
Upon leaving the store, customers were asked to fill out a questionnaire concerning their
affective reactions, evaluations, and approach behavior toward the store environment and
products. The presence of the ambient scent in the store had a positive effect on all measured
outcomes.
de Wijk and Zijlstra (2012) exposed subjects to ambient food-related aromas at identical
test rooms at the research facilities of the Restaurant of the Future in Wageningen: one room
was scented with a citrus aroma, one with a vanilla aroma and one room was odorless. Among
other measures, actual food choice of congruent and non-congruent foods was examined,
where the plates consisted of citrus-congruent food (mandarin orange segments and orange
juice), vanilla congruent food (vanilla cookies and milk) or neutral in relation to either aroma
(cubes of cheese and mineral water). Subjects were told that food in the room was present for
their convenience and were free to sample. Consumption of food was measured by tallying
food and by weighing drinks present at the beginning and end of the session. Exposure to
the ambient citrus aroma increased number of portions of mandarin consumed and reduced
selection of cheese.
2.2 Willingness to pay and money spent
Another strand of the literature tries to isolate the effect of scents on consumer spending
or WTP. One of the earliest studies that, at the time, received high media attention (Hirsch,
1990 cited in Lindstrom, 2005; copies of the original report can be found in Corbett, 1994,
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page 97), showed that by placing two identical Nike sneakers in two separate rooms, one room
containing a floral scent and one room a neutral scent, had a significant effect on likelihood
to purchase the sneakers. Customers in the floral scented room stated they were 84% more
likely to purchase the sneakers. In addition, in the original report it is stated that 10% of
those effected with the scent, which amounts to three subjects, stated an average WTP of
10.33$ more than participants not exposed to the floral scent. By any kind of standards,
descriptive statistics from just three subjects seem absurd, however, this widely publicized
result prompted others in pursuing similar research agendas.
Fiore et al. (2000) varied the display of a sleepwear in a room on campus and that of
the ambient scent in the room. The display consisted of a female mannequin, a three-fold
dressing mirror, two floral pillows, a white textured throw blanket, two candle holders with
white candles, a vase with dried flowers, and lighting. Besides a control unscented condition,
they varied the scent treatment at two levels. In one scent condition they used a potpouri
scent described as ‘Lily of the Valley’ which was rated by a different group of subjects as
appropriate for the sleepwear presentation, whereas in another scent condition they used a
potpouri scent described as ‘Sea Mist’ which was rated as inappropriate for the sleepwear
presentation. Among other measures, they asked subjects to indicate (hypothetically) their
WTP. The authors found a statistically different WTP between the product on display with
an appropriate scent (mean WTP=29.6$) and the product on display with an inappropriate
scent (mean WTP=24.8$) while the appropriate fragrance condition did not differ with the
control unscented condition (mean WTP=28.4$) when the product was on display.
Mattila and Wirtz (2001) conducted a field experiment where they examined the inter-
action of scents and music on impulse buying. They adopted a 3 (no scent vs. low arousal
(Lavender) scent vs. high arousal (Grapefruit) scent) × 3 (no music vs. low arousal music
vs. high arousal music) experimental design inside a gift shop. The study was conducted
in three shifts over fourteen consecutive days at the chosen retail and the treatments were
randomized across shifts. Impulse buying was measured on a self-reported seven-point Likert
scale where subjects had to indicate whether they ‘bought more than what had planned to
buy’. The congruent condition of a high arousal music and high arousal scent was associated
with higher stated impulse buying than other single stimulus or incongruent conditions.
Michon et al. (2006) conducted another field experiment in four consecutive weeks in a
mall in Montreal following a 2 (fast 96 bpm vs. slow 60 bpm music tempo of ‘light rock’
music) × 2 (citrus scent vs. no scent) experimental design.4 The ambient scent was diffused
in the shopping mall’s main corridor located between two major retailers. Sampled subjects
4The study by Chebat and Michon (2003) seems to be partially reporting two out of four treatments of
Michon et al. (2006).
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filled-in a self-administered questionnaire where they were asked to indicate how much money
they’ve spent on non-food shopping. Average shopper spending was higher when ambient
scent and fast tempo music conditions were combined (57.93$) or when slow tempo music
was played with no ambient odor (58.84$).
The congruency-incongruency of music arousal level (slow vs. fast tempo) with scent
arousal level (lavender vs. grapefruit) was also examined in Homburg et al. (2012) where
they asked subjects to state their willingness to pay for a washing machine and a smartphone.
They found a higher WTP for both products when subjects were either in the high music
arousal - high scent arousal or in the low music arousal - low scent arousal conditions. That is,
congruency of music and scent was a significant factor positively affecting WTP as compared
to incongruency.
Morrison et al. (2011) varied the presence of a vanilla scent and volume of an upbeat
dance music compilation (low vs. high) played on repeat every three hours in a fashion retail
store located in a shopping district of a major metropolitan area in Australia. Subjects, when
exited the store, where asked to fill in a questionnaire and state, among others, how much
money they’ve spent in the store. They found that the congruency of high volume music
and presence of vanilla scent increased pleasure levels, which in turn positively influenced
shopping behavior, including time and money spent in the store.
Gue´guen and Petr (2006) did a field experiment in a restaurant setting (small pizzeria
in Brittany, France) where they administered two scent treatment (lavender vs. lemon)
and a no scent treatment over three Saturdays. Subjects in the lavender treatment spent
significantly more money (e21.1) than subjects in the lemon and no scent treatment (e18.1
and e17.5, respectively).
Spangenberg et al. (2006) explored the effect of the congruency of gender with gender
specific scents that were diffused in a clothing store selling both men’s and women’s clothing
in equivalent quadrate floor spaces. During a two week period, half of the customers were
exposed to a masculine scent (rose maroc) and half to a feminine scent (vanilla). This
experimental design resulted in congruent and incogruent conditions.5 Subjects filled in
questionnaires that asked them to self-report their spending which was also matched with
retailer provided information about the number of individual clothing items purchased and
dollars spent by each individual customer. The authors found that subjects in the congruent
condition spent more than double the money than subjects in the incogruent condition
(55.12$ vs. 23.01$).
5The scent was congruent when the scent’s gender orientation matched the gender of the products offered
(i.e., rose maroc for men’s clothing, and vanilla for women’s clothing) and incongruent when the scent’s gender
orientation did not correspond with the product offering (i.e., rose maroc for women’s clothing and vanilla
for men’s clothing).
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2.3 Risky decision making
Studies that explore the effect of scents on choice under risk are scarce. Hirsch (1995)
conducted the earliest study we are aware of, on a casino floor of a large hotel in Las
Vegas. Two different areas of slot machines were scented with two different scents starting
on the midnight of a given weekend. The amount of money gambled in the weekend was
recorded and compared with the weekends before and after the experiment as well as with
a control slot machine area that was not scented. Hirsch (1995) reported that the money
gambled increased by 45% in the experimental weekend vs. the weekend before and after
the experiment.
Hancock (2009) rightly criticized Hirsch (1995) for not publishing the list of the compo-
nents of the fragrances that were used, which precluded further testing of Hirsch’s (1995)
findings. She also points that Hirsch (1995) did not disclose whether the experiment was
conducted during a holiday weekend or on a weekend where one or more special events were
being held on the casino or in town, which could be a confounding factor of the experimental
results. Hancock (2009) improved the experimental design by conducting the experiment in
a large United States casino over a period of 20 days. In this period, in five different slot
machine locations within the casino, two refreshing and two soothing scents were diffused
while the fifth room served as the non-scented control room. The treatments were rotated
across rooms in order to randomize possible confounds of popularity of location, ease of
access and popularity of machines. Hancock (2009) found that a soothing natural fragrance
droved higher and statistically significant coin-in.
More recently, Gagarina and Pikturniene˙ (2015) manipulated scent type (vanilla vs. pep-
permint) and intensiveness level (high vs. low concentration) in a laboratory environment
and found no effect of any of the treatment variables on risk aversion as measured from hy-
pothetical lottery choice tasks. Admittedly, their sample size per treatment was particularly
low (18-19 subjects per treatment).
3 Experimental design
In October 2015 we recruited 160 subjects from the undergraduate population of the
university. Subjects participated in sessions of 15 or 10 subjects arranged in the middle
of the week. Sessions started from 10 am and concluded by 2 pm. Subjects were split in
two treatments: the control treatment and the scent treatment. In the scent treatment
subjects were exposed to an olfactory stimuli (described momentarily) that was diffused in
the lab room using a dispenser. In a single day only one of the treatments was run to avoid
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Table 1: Experimental design
Day Date Scent treatment No scent treatment
Wednesday 21-Oct - 40 subjects
Thursday 22-Oct 40 subjects -
Wednesday 04-Nov 40 subjects -
Thursday 05-Nov - 40 subjects
any possible contamination between treatments due to fragrance residuals (although the
manufacturer reassured us that there will be no residuals left after one hour from turning
off the dispenser) and the lab was fully ventilated overnight. Before the first session each
morning, the room was ‘sniff-tested’ by the experimenter and a research assistant and no
residual odors were detected. The treatments were counter balanced over weekdays (see
Table 1).
Upon arrival, subjects were given a consent form to sign and when all subjects necessary
to form an auction group had arrived (subjects participated in auction groups of 5 subjects),
each one of them was randomly seated to one of the PC private booths. Printed instruc-
tions were given to all subjects and the experimenter read aloud instructions. Subjects were
specifically instructed to raise their hand and ask any questions in private and that the ex-
perimenter would then share her answer with the group. They received a show-up fee of e4.
Subjects could earn or lose money during the experiment (described momentarily), so that
average total payouts were e10.8 (S.D.=2.84, min=1.1, max=24). After instructions were
read aloud, subjects filled a series of computerized control questions to enhance comprehen-
sion of instructions. They were free to advise their printed instructions or ask questions to
the experimenter and generally showed a good understanding with an average of 10.5 correct
answers out of 12 questions.
The experiment consisted of three stages (experimental instructions are reproduced in
English in Appendix C). In Stage 1 subjects went through a typical real effort task where they
had to count and report the number of zeros shown in a 5×5 matrix. This task was repeated
10 times (the elements of the matrix where random and changed with each repetition but
was the same for all subjects at a given repetition) and subjects could earn e0.5 every
time they correctly solved the task within 25 seconds. The task aimed at mitigating house
money effects by making subjects earn part of their endowment (e..g., Corgnet et al., 2014;
Jacquemet et al., 2009). The zero counting task was purposefully made easy (as evident by
the fact that earned real effort money averaged e4.83 with a standard deviation of 0.32 and
that 75% and 18.1% of subjects earned exactly e5 and e4.5, respectively), so that subjects
would start off in Stage 2 of the experiment with approximately equal endowments.
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3.1 The 2nd price auction
In Stage 2 subjects participated in a series of 2nd price Vickrey auctions (Vickrey, 1961)
in groups of 5 subjects. Matching in groups was random and remained the same throughout
the session. Subjects were unaware of which other subjects in the session composed their
group. The group size was decided with three things in mind: a) avoid disengaging off-margin
bidders from the auction procedure (Shogren et al., 2001) by having ‘too large’ groups b)
given that price feedback in repeated 2nd price auctions is discouraged (Corrigan et al., 2012),
avoid ‘too small’ groups that would, by design, reveal bidding behavior of other subjects and
c) increase the number of independent observations (if we count the auction group as the
unit of an independent observation).
The mechanics of the auction were explained in the instructions but were also practiced
by allowing subjects to hypothetically bid in three repeated training rounds for two non-
focal products: a pack of biscuits and a USB stick (pictures of the products as shown to
the subjects can be found in Appendix B; pictures B.1a and B.1b). Bids were entered
simultaneously for the two goods. The purpose of the training rounds was to closely mimic
the real auctions rounds that followed.
Right after the training rounds, subjects were shown pictures of the real products in their
computer screens (shown in Appendix B: pictures B.2a and B.2b) and real products were
circulated in the lab for subjects to observe closely if they wished to do so. Both products
are not available in the market, were custom made for the experimenters and were purchased
at approximately the same price. Subjects were then asked to complete hedonic evaluations
of the products (on a scale from 1=‘dislike very much’ to 9=‘like very much’). Ten repeated
rounds of a 2nd price auction followed and subjects were told that only one round and one
product would be randomly selected at the end of the session (separately for each auction
group) and that the 2nd price would be substracted from the highest bidder’s income.
3.2 Risk preference elicitation
In Stage 3, we elicited subjects’ risk preferences using the Holt and Laury (2002) task
(HL) as well as a modified version which varies the payoff amounts instead of the probabilities
(payoff varying - PV). In the HL task individuals are asked to make a series of 10 decisions
between two options (see Table 2). In option A, the high payoff amount is fixed at e2 and
the low payoff amount is fixed at e1.60 across all 10 decision tasks. In option B, the high
payoff amount is fixed at e3.85 and the low payoff amount is fixed at e0.10. The only thing
changing across the 10 decisions are the probabilities assigned to the high and low payoffs.
Initially the probability of receiving the high payoff is 0.10 but by the tenth decision task, the
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Table 2: The Holt and Laury (2002) risk preference task
Lottery A Lottery B EVA e EVB e EV difference
p e p e p e p e
0.1 2 0.9 1.6 0.1 3.85 0.9 0.1 1.640 0.475 1.165
0.2 2 0.8 1.6 0.2 3.85 0.8 0.1 1.680 0.850 0.830
0.3 2 0.7 1.6 0.3 3.85 0.7 0.1 1.720 1.225 0.495
0.4 2 0.6 1.6 0.4 3.85 0.6 0.1 1.760 1.600 0.160
0.5 2 0.5 1.6 0.5 3.85 0.5 0.1 1.800 1.975 -0.175
0.6 2 0.4 1.6 0.6 3.85 0.4 0.1 1.840 2.350 -0.510
0.7 2 0.3 1.6 0.7 3.85 0.3 0.1 1.880 2.725 -0.845
0.8 2 0.2 1.6 0.8 3.85 0.2 0.1 1.920 3.100 -1.180
0.9 2 0.1 1.6 0.9 3.85 0.1 0.1 1.960 3.475 -1.515
1 2 0 1.6 1 3.85 0 0.1 2.000 3.850 -1.850
probability is 1. As shown in Table 2, the expected value of lottery A exceeds the expected
value of lottery B for the first four decision tasks. Thus, a risk neutral person should prefer
lottery A for the first four decision tasks and then switch to lottery B for the remainder.
Drichoutis and Lusk (2016) argue that the Holt and Laury (2002) task is more accurate
at eliciting the shape of the probability weighting function given that it varies probabilities
and keeps the monetary amounts constant. They then constructed a task that varies the
amounts and keeps probabilities constant at 0.5 for all payoffs. They showed that combining
information from the HL and the PV task, greater predictive performance can be achieved.
Table 3 shows a payoff varying task that keeps the probabilities constant across the ten
decision tasks and changes instead the monetary payoffs down the ten tasks. The monetary
payoffs are varied in a way that the pattern of choices for a risk neutral person is similar to
the HL task i.e., such a person should prefer lottery A for the first four decision tasks and
then switch to lottery B for the remainder.
Instead of providing a table of choices arrayed in an ordered manner all appearing at
the same screen as in HL, each choice was presented separately showing probabilities and
prizes as in Andersen et al. (2014). The order of appearance of the HL and PV tasks were
randomized on a between-subjects basis. An example of one of the decision tasks is shown
in Figure B.3. For each subject, one of the choices was randomly chosen and paid out at the
end of the session.
3.3 Questionnaire and manipulation check
In Stage 4 subjects went through a short questionnaire that elicited standard demographic
characteristics. Subjects were then asked a decoy question of whether they noticed music in
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Table 3: The payoff varying risk preference task
Lottery A Lottery B EVA e EVB e EV difference
p e p e p e p e
0.5 1 0.5 1 0.5 1.2 0.5 0.2 1.00 0.70 0.300
0.5 1.2 0.5 1 0.5 1.5 0.5 0.2 1.10 0.85 0.250
0.5 1.4 0.5 1 0.5 1.8 0.5 0.2 1.20 1.00 0.200
0.5 1.6 0.5 1 0.5 2.2 0.5 0.2 1.30 1.20 0.100
0.5 1.8 0.5 1 0.5 2.9 0.5 0.2 1.40 1.55 -0.150
0.5 2.0 0.5 1 0.5 3.5 0.5 0.2 1.50 1.85 -0.350
0.5 2.2 0.5 1 0.5 4.6 0.5 0.2 1.60 2.40 -0.800
0.5 2.4 0.5 1 0.5 6.8 0.5 0.2 1.70 3.50 -1.800
0.5 2.6 0.5 1 0.5 9.2 0.5 0.2 1.80 4.70 -2.900
0.5 2.8 0.5 1 0.5 15 0.5 0.2 1.90 7.60 -5.700
the lab which they could answer with a Yes/No. This question was asked in order to cover
up the purpose of the next question which asked subjects whether they noticed a scent in
the lab which they could answer with a Yes/No as well.
Given that odors can be either perceived attentively (e.g., ‘I smell banana’ or ‘I smell
something’) or inattentively (subjects show no evidence of being aware of something in
particular), the question about scent perception aimed in classifying subjects according to
awareness circumstances. Smeets and Dijksterhuis (2014) have shown that the effects of
olfactory stimuli on perceptual and cognitive processing can be conceived of as priming. In
this respect, attentive awareness of a scent can be seen as a form of supraliminal priming
while inattentive awareness of a scent can be seen as a form of subliminal priming. The
differential effects of supraliminal and subliminal scents on consumer behavior have been
documented by some studies (e.g., Baron, 1983; Bosmans, 2006; Li et al., 2007). For social
psychologists it makes no qualitative difference whether a subject is aware of the stimulus
event or not, but whether the individual is aware of the influence of the presented stimulus
(Bargh, 1992). If subjects are aware of the persuasive power of an olfactory stimuli, they may
apply defensive mechanisms towards it to correct for it extraneous effect (see for example
Baron, 1983). To account for this fact, subjects were also asked an open ended question
about what they think the purpose of the research was. No subject mentioned the word
‘scent’ or any other synonyms as the topic of exploration of the research project.
An additional set of questions scrutinized subjects for factors that relate to olfactory
disorders like antibiotic use, nasal spray use, smoking status as well as direct questions about
known taste and smell disorders. A final set of questions asked subjects to evaluate on 7 point
Likert scales satisfaction with the lab environment (1=‘extremely dissatisfied’, 7=‘extremely
satisfied’), the lab’s ambient conditions (1=‘very unpleasant’, 7=‘very pleasant’), subjects’
12
feeling during the session (1=‘extremely relaxed’, 7=‘extremely energetic’), interaction with
the experimenters (1=‘very bad’, 7=‘very good’) and overall experience (1=‘very unpleasant’,
7=‘very pleasant’).
3.4 Scent selection considerations
In selecting a scent to use as the olfactory stimuli in the lab, we took into account pleas-
antness, congruity and memory of scents which are listed as key aspects of scent marketing
(Goldkuhl and Styve´n, 2007).
First we sought in testing the effect of a pleasant stimuli. This is because a pleasant
stimuli is likely to be more relevant for marketing applications given the focus of companies
in creating a pleasurable shopping experience by modifying the air design aspect of their
stores. Although unpleasant stimuli have been explored in the literature (e.g., Grabenhorst
et al., 2007; Sutani et al., 2007), these are rather outliers since the vast majority of studies
explores pleasant olfactory stimuli.
Second, we opted for an odor mixture rather than an individual odor. This is because
perception of an odor can be significantly influenced by a verbal label attributed to the odor
(Herz and von Clef, 2001). Once a scent can be verbally labeled, cognitive processing is no
longer implicit or automatic (Smeets and Dijksterhuis, 2014) leading to semantic overshad-
owing (Melcher and Schooler, 1996). Verbalizing an individual odor can be a very difficult
task (Cain, 1979), therefore, by selecting an odor mixture we effectively precluded subjects
from verbalizing the odor which would interfere with automaticity of cognitive processing.
A third consideration has to do with congruity of the smell and the actual product or
service provided. In some studies, congruency has been shown to influence consumers more
than incongruent conditions (Mitchell et al., 1995). For example, in Bone and Jantrania
(1992) a household cleaner and a sunscreen were more positively evaluated when they were
scented with lemon and coconut, respectively, since this is what consumers assume appropri-
ate in these situations. More recently, Olofsson et al. (2012) found that subjects performed
faster and more accurately in an object evaluation task when in a congruent scent condition
than in a condition which varied valence (pleasantness) of the scent. Parsons (2009) even
found a negative effect of an incongruent scent on liking a store and intention to shop at
the store. Goldkuhl and Styve´n (2007) note the importance of congruent scents for edible
products (e.g., the smell of a freshly baked product in a bakery shop) because this allows
providers to tangibilise their offerings. The olfactory-visual congruency is not unique to
adults but has been shown for infants as well (Wada et al., 2012).
On the other hand, Bosmans (2006) have found that as long as the scent is perceived as
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pleasant and is not completely incongruent, it can still have an effect on product evaluations.
Ehrlichman and Halpern (1988) showed that exposure to a pleasant ambient scent led to
subjects retrieving a larger number of happy memories than in a non-scented condition
because pleasantness can be congruent with the material in long-term memory; thus, they
showed that scent congruence with the product is not a necessary condition. Parsons (2009)
provides a good overview of the literature on congruent and incongruent scents.
Finally, we opted for a (mixed) citrus scent as citrus scents have been used very often
in the literature (e.g., Chebat and Michon, 2003; Chebat et al., 2009; Michon et al., 2005;
Liu et al., 2008, for a few examples). This is likely due to an early influential paper by
Spangenberg et al. (1996) where they pretested 26 different scents and found that an orange
scent scored high in both an affective and activation dimension, and was therefore deemed
appropriate to use in an affectively pleasing experimental condition.
After reviewing what is available in the market we finally selected the Airoma R© XTREME
‘Florida Zest’ by Vectair Systems (a picture of the aerosol can is shown in Figure B.4a in
Appendix B). The accompanying advertisement — ‘. . . you can expect to experience a fresh
citrus complex made up of orange, grapefruit and mandarin, interlaced with neroli and orange
flower’ — cleary indicates the mixed citrus nature of the scent although, in practice, it would
be very difficult for anyone to distinguish the components of the mix. The advertisement
was not communicated to the subjects nor at any point was it made obvious that the room
was scented on purpose since the treatment was meant to be kept below subjects’ awareness
levels.
3.5 Scent diffusion in the lab
To achieve scent diffusion in the lab we used a scent dispenser (shown in Figure B.4b in
Appendix B). The scent dispenser was installed at one of the lab walls at a distance of 1.80m
from the ground, as suggested by the manufacturer, and was turned on only during the scent
treatment days (see Table 1). Scent diffusion started half an hour before the first session in
a day and delivered one spray-dose every six minutes in order to maintain continuous scent
intensity. The air-conditioning system was set to maintain a constant temperature of 25◦C
but ventilation was turned off so that the scent would not wear off.
Figure B.5 (see Appendix B) shows the plan room for the laboratory with the position
of the dispenser marked in a red circle. Numbers on the vertical and horizontal axis depict
the respective distance of any given computer booth from the dispenser in computer units6.
6So, for example, the computer booth corresponding to horizontal=2, vertical=3, denotes a computer
that is placed 3 computers away on the vertical axis and 2 computers away in the horizontal axis (either on
the left or the right). We make no distinction as per whether a subject was seated on the left or the right of
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We use this information later to show that it doesn’t matter with respect to scent awareness
where a subject was seated in the lab. In any given session, the lab room was either filled
from the back to the front or vice versa and the order was counter balanced across sessions.
4 Theory and econometrics of risk preferences
One way to go about estimating treatment effects for risk preferences is to count sub-
jects’ number of safe choices (number of times the left lottery is chosen) and then regress
this number on the treatment variables. However, Drichoutis and Lusk (2016) present a
simple numerical example that demonstrates that if people weigh probabilities non-linearly,
then simply observing the switching point in HL types of decision tasks, is insufficient to
identify the shape of the utility function and the shape of the probability weighting function.
Furthermore, just using the number of times a lottery is chosen in a regression, typically
ignores the accumulated literature on stochastic error specifications of risk choice data (e.g.,
Hey et al., 2010; Hey, 2005; Wilcox, 2008, 2011, 2015). Hey (2014) notes that the stochastic
specification is not merely an econometric issue, but also a behavioural one which experts
in the field feel that it is the key to understanding behaviour, perhaps even more important
than the preference functional.
Therefore, we follow what is considered the gold standard in this literature and employ
structural econometric methods (see for example Harrison and Rutstro¨m, 2008, for a ped-
agogical treatise). Let the utility function be the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
specification7:
U(M) =
M1−r
1− r (1)
where r is the relative risk aversion (RRA) coefficient, r = 0 denotes risk neutral behavior,
r > 0 denotes risk aversion behavior and r < 0 denotes risk loving behavior. If we assume
that Expected Utility Theory (EUT) describes subjects’ risk preferences, then the expected
utility of lottery i can be written as:
EUi =
∑
j=1,2
pi(Mj)U(Mj) (2)
where p(Mj) are the probabilities for each outcome Mj that are induced by the exper-
imenter (shown in Tables 2 and 3). Despite the intuitive and conceptual appeal of EUT,
a number of experiments suggest that EUT often fails as a descriptive model of individual
the dispenser.
7Constant relative risk aversion, rather than increasing or decreasing relative risk aversion, is a realistic
assumption given the narrow range of prizes paid out in the lottery choice tasks.
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behavior. A popular alternative is Rank Dependent Utility (RDU) developed by Quiggin
(1982), which was incorporated into Tversky and Kahneman’s (1992) cumulative prospect
theory. RDU extends the EUT model by allowing for non-linear probability weighting as-
sociated with lottery outcomes.8 To calculate decision weights under RDU, one replaces
expected utility in equation (2) with:
RDUi =
∑
j=1,2
wi[p(Mj)]U(Mj) =
∑
j=1,2
wijU(Mj) (3)
where wi2 = wi(p2 + p1) − wi(p1) = 1 − wi(p1) and wi1 = wi(p1) with outcomes ranked
8As in most experiments of choice under risk, our experiment involved multiple choices over lotteries
for which subjects where randomly paid for one of these choices. This payoff mechanism, known as the
Random Lottery Incentive Mechanism (RLIM), is under criticism. As first put forward by Holt (1986),
given the reduction axiom, RLIM is incentive compatible if and only if the Independence Axiom holds. Given
that RDU does not include the independence axiom, then RLIM is inappropriate for non-EUT theories on
theoretical grounds. The issue seemed to have been settled for a while perhaps due to open statements from
prominent experimentalists. For example, Wakker (2007) argued that the RLIM issue has unduly hindered
many papers in the review process and that it is counter-productive to re-hash the issue each and every time
and Hey and Lee (2005b) concluded that “...experimenters can continue to use the random lottery incentive
mechanism and that this paper can be used as a defense against referees who argue that the procedure
is unsafe”. However, the issue has been re-opened recently by one group of researchers (Cox et al., 2014;
Harrison and Swarthout, 2014) with fairly convincing evidence. Nevertheless, researchers continue to use
the RLIM under non-EUT theories as the preferred method of payment (this is true even for researchers
that criticized the RLIM for testing non-EUT: Harrison et al., 2015; Harrison and Swarthout, 2016). Using
the RLIM under non-EUT specifications either invokes the assumption of the isolation effect i.e., that a
subject views each choice in an experiment as independent of other choices in the experiment or assumes
two independence axioms as in Harrison and Swarthout (2016): one axiom that applies to the evaluation
of a given prospect which is assumed to be violated by non-EUT, and another axiom that applies to the
evaluation of the experimental payment protocol. Only the validity of the latter axiom is required to ensure
incentive compatibility of the RLIM.
To further defend our choice of the RLIM, we test for the simplest form of contamination that would render
isolation invalid and RLIM non-incentive compatible. We test the hypothesis that in answering any question,
subjects takes into account the decision made on the immediately preceding question, by hypothesizing that
subjects weigh the current decision with ω (0 ≤ ω ≤ 1) and the previous decision with 1 − ω (Hey and
Zhou, 2014). Other contamination hypotheses have also been considered (Hey and Lee, 2005b,a) which are,
admittedly, highly cognitively demanding: 1) in answering each question subjects consider the experiment as
a whole; 2) in answering any question subjects take into account their answers to all the preceding questions.
We would rationally expect that if a low cognitively demanding contamination hypothesis is rejected, it is
unlikely that subjects choose based on more complicated forms of contamination.
The simple contamination form we explore here was first set forth by Hey and Zhou (2014). In notation
form, when a subject is facing a decision, she is faced with a choice between the compound lotteries (dn−1, (1−
ω);An, ω) and (dn−1, (1− ω);Bn, ω) where An, Bn are lotteries A and B, respectively, that subject faces in
the nth decision. dn−1 is the lottery chosen in the previous n− 1 decision, that is, dn−1 = (A1, p;A2, 1− p)
or dn−1 = (B1, p;B2, 1 − p) where A1, A2, B1, B2, p are the outcomes and probabilities of lotteries shown
in Tables 2 and 3. Note that when ω = 1 the subject separates completely and there is no contamination.
When we estimate this model for the preferred RDU specification (choosing between alternative probability
weighting functions and stochastic error specifications is discussed in the Results section) we estimate ω =
0.977. A Wald test of whether ω = 1 fails to reject the null (p-value=0.779) indicating that isolation of
choice tasks is a plausible hypothesis with our data.
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from worst to best and w(·) is the probability weighting function.
There are many probability weighting functions that have been used in the literature and
here we consider various one and two parameter functions:
1. The power function (Quiggin, 1982): w(p) = pβ
2. Tversky and Kahneman’s (1992) (TK) function: w(p) = p
γ
(pγ+(1−p)γ)
1
γ
(if γ = 1 it
collapses to w(p) = p)
3. The linear-in-log odds (LinLog) function (Goldstein and Einhorn, 1987; Lattimore
et al., 1992; Tversky and Fox, 1995; Gonzalez and Wu, 1999): w(p) = δp
γ
δpγ+(1−p)γ where
δ > 0, γ > 0 (if δ = γ = 1 it collapses to w(p) = p; if δ = 1, γ 6= 1 it collapses to
Karmarkar’s (1978; 1979) one parameter probability weighting function)
4. Prelec’s (Prelec, 1998) one parameter function: w(p) = exp(−(−lnp)a) where 0 <
a, 0 < p < 1 (if a = 1 it collapses to w(p) = p)
5. General Prelec (two parameter) function (Prelec, 1998)9: w(p) = exp(−β(−lnp)a)
where a > 0, 0 < p < 1, β > 0 (if a = 1 it collapses to the power function w(p) = pβ; if
a = β = 1 it collapses to w(p) = p)
4.1 Stochastic error specifications
We assume subjects have some latent preferences over risk which are linked to observed
choices via a probabilistic model function of the general form:
Pr(B) = F
(
µ
(VB − VA)
D
)
(4)
where Pr(B) is the probability of choosing lottery B (the right lottery), µ is a structural
‘noise parameter’ (sometimes called a scale or precision parameter) used to allow some er-
rors from the perspective of the deterministic model and VA, VB are the decision-theoretic
representations of values associated with lotteries A and B i.e., Vj = EUj for j = A, B
if the theory is EU or Vj = RDUj for j = A, B if the theory is RDU. F : R → [0, 1] is
an increasing function with F (0) = 0.5 and F (x) = 1 − F (−x), which is to say that this
function takes any argument between ±∞ and transforms it to a number between 0 and 1
i.e., a probability. The F function comes into two flavors in the respective literature: the
9Note, that both Prelec functions are often applied with the constraint 0 < a < 1 which requires that the
probability weighting function exhibits subproportionality (weighting function exhibits an inverse-S shape
form). We follow Andersen et al. (2014, 2015); Harrison and Ng (2016) and use the more general specification
from Prelec (1998, Proposition 1: (C)), which only requires a > 0 and nests the case where 0 < a < 1.
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cumulative standard normal distribution function Φ (the probit link) and the standard lo-
gistic distribution function Λ with Λ(ζ) = 1/(1 + e−ζ) (the logit link). D adjusts the scale
parameter in heteroskedastic models.
One popular class of models derives from equation (4) when we restrict D = 1. This
is a class of homoskedastic latent index models also known as Fechnerian or Strong utility
models (see Drichoutis and Lusk, 2014). The model with the logit link is equivalent to
Pr(B) = Λ (µ(VB − VA)) = exp(µVB)exp(µVA)+exp(µVB) . Another type of the homoskedastic class of
models, called Luce or Strict utility models, uses the logarithm of values in the numerator
of equation (4): Pr(B) = Λ (µ(ln[VB]− ln[VA])) which is equivalent to Pr(B) = (VB)µ(VA)µ+(VB)µ .
A second class of models, the heteroskedastic class, derives from equation (4) when
D 6= 1. Wilcox (2008, 2011) proposed a ‘contextual utility’ error specification which adjusts
the scale parameter by D = Vmax − Vmin to account for the range of possible outcome
utilities. D is defined as the maximum utility Vmax over all prizes in a lottery pair minus the
minimum utility Vmin over all prizes in the same lottery pair. It changes from lottery pair
to lottery pair, and thus it is said to be contextual. Contextual utility maintains that the
error specification is mediated by the range of possible outcome utilities in a pair, so that
Pr(B) = F
(
µ (VB−VA)
Vmax−Vmin
)
.
Another heteroskedastic model which has received some attention in economics lately
(Hey et al., 2010; Wilcox, 2015) is prescribed by Decision Field Theory (DFT) (Busemeyer
and Townsend, 1992, 1993). DFT allows the decision maker’s attention to switch from one
event to another across choice pairs. This variability on focus on events is caused by a
random difference which Busemeyer and Townsend (1993) name a valence difference. The
variance of this valence difference in the case of lotteries with just two outcomes is given by
D2 = w(p1)(VA1−VB1)2 +(1−w(p1))(VA2−VB2)2− (VA−VB)2 where VA1, VA2, VB1 and VB2
are the representations of values associated with the first and second outcome of lottery A
and B, respectively. Note that when lotteries are certainties, such as in the last row of the
HL task, then D = 0 and Pr(B) = 1, that is the subject always chooses the dominating
lottery.10
10As a practical note, since D = 0 when lotteries are certainties, the last row of the HL task defined over
certainties must be excluded from estimation.
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4.2 Estimation
After defining the decision theoretical models and error specifications, the log-likelihood
function can then be written as:
lnL(y) =
N∑
i=1
[
(lnZ|yi = 1) + (ln(1− Z)|yi = −1)
]
(5)
where Z = Prj and j indexes the different error models (j =FP, FL, STRICT, CP, CL,
DFTP, DFTL).11 yi = 1 denotes the choice of lottery B and yi = −1 denotes the choice
of the A lottery in the risk preference task i. Subjects were allowed to express indifference
between choices and were told that if that choice was selected to be played out, the computer
would randomly choose one of the two options for them and that both choices had equal
chances of being selected. The likelihood function for indifferent choices is constructed such
that it implies a 50/50 mixture of the likelihood of choosing either lottery so that (5) can
be rewritten as:
lnL(y) =
N∑
i=1
[
(lnZ|yi = 1) + (ln(1− Z)|yi = −1) + (1
2
lnZ +
1
2
ln(1− Z)|yi = 0)
]
(6)
Equation (6) is maximized using standard numerical methods. The statistical specifica-
tion also takes into account the multiple responses given by the same subject and allows for
correlation between responses by clustering standard errors i.e., it relaxes the independence
assumption and requires only that the observations be independent across the clusters. The
robust estimator of variance that relaxes the assumption of independent observations in-
volves a slight modiffication of the robust (or sandwich) estimator of variance which requires
independence across all observations (StataCorp, 2013, pp. 312).
5 Results
5.1 Was scent diffusion successful?
Table 4 shows the number of subjects answering with a Yes/No in the scent awareness
question. There is a marked shift toward ‘Yes’ responses in the scent treatment (a χ2
test rejects the null of no difference between treatments; p-value < 0.001) which is a good
11FP and FL stand for the Fechner error with a probit and a logit link, respectively. CP and CL stand
for contextual utility with a probit and a logit link, respectively. DFTP and DFTL stand for Decision Field
theory with a probit and a logit link respectively. STRICT stands for Luce error or Strict utility
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Table 4: Attentive awareness of scent in comparison to the no scent treatment
Treatment
No scent Scent
Perceived existence of scent
Yes 14 39
No 66 41
indication that the scent treatment was successful in exogenously varying awareness of the
olfactory stimulus.
Table 4 shows that subjects in the scent treatment are about equally split in two groups.
We call the group that perceived awareness of the scent as the supraliminal scent group and
the group that did not perceive the existence of the scent as the subliminal scent group. We
can explore the factors that contributed to scent awareness by means of a logit regression.
Model (1) in Table 5 shows results from a logit regression of scent awareness on the horizontal
and vertical distance of a subject’s booth from the scent dispenser. As evident none of these
variables is statistically significant which is to be interpreted that being close or away from
the dispenser was not a factor that determines awareness of the scent.
Model (2) augments the specification by adding variables that aim to capture factors that
may affect the sense of smell such as antibiotics and nasal medicine use, smoking status, any
known to the subject taste and olfactory dysfunction as well as gender and age. None of the
variables is statistically significant. In fact, a χ2 test of the joint significance of all variables
fails to reject the null at conventional statistical significance levels.
These results are reassuring in that they show that perceived awareness of the scent
was only determined by subjects’ nasal chemosensory performance. Olfactory sensitivity is
determined by the odor threshold (i.e., the lowest concentration of a certain odor compound
that is perceivable by the human sense of smell) which can vary widely between subjects
(e.g., Lawless et al., 1995; Wilby, 1969). This natural variation in odor thresholds reflects
the split of subjects into the supraliminal and subliminal scent groups.
5.2 Scent effects on willingness to pay
We can gain some first insights by looking at scatter graphs of bids. Figure 1 shows a
scatter plot of bids by treatment where the two axis show bids for the two auctioned products
(mug on the vertical axis and chocolate on the horizontal axis). The graph illustrates a
larger spread of bids in the scent treatment which implies higher WTP for both products.
Figure 2 shows bids for the scent treatment split between the supraliminal and subliminal
scent groups. With respect to mug, bids tend to overlap for the two scent groups. For the
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Table 5: Logit regressions of supraliminal awareness of scent
(1) (2)
Constant 0.425 (0.792) -2.655 (3.536)
H1 0.370 (0.632) 0.383 (0.674)
H2 -0.739 (0.628) -0.616 (0.657)
V2 -0.218 (0.770) -0.209 (0.834)
V3 -0.672 (0.746) -0.600 (0.809)
V4 -0.384 (0.690) -0.249 (0.722)
Male -0.102 (0.531)
Age 0.177 (0.158)
Olfactory dysfunction: No 0.932 (0.731)
Antibiotics use: No -0.172 (0.741)
Nasal medicine use: No -0.489 (1.033)
Smoking: No -0.414 (0.708)
Smoking: Occasionally -0.482 (0.972)
Taste dysfunction: No -0.382 (1.240)
N 80 80
Log-likelihood -52.276 -50.611
χ2 (p-value) 6.30 (0.278) 9.63 (0.724)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
chocolate product bids are spread more to the right of the graph, indicating a higher WTP
for the supraliminal scent group but tend to overlap on the vertical axis, indicating a similar
WTP for the two scent groups. In both figures, bids are concentrated above the 45◦degree
line indicating a higher WTP for the mug than the chocolate.
Simple statistical tests support the pattern described above. Table 6 shows mean, median
and standard deviation of bids per product, per treatment and per supraliminal/subliminal
group. The upper part of the table indicates a higher mean and median WTP for the scent
treatment as well as a larger spread. The Kruskal-Wallis test (Kruskal and Wallis, 1952)
and the K-sample median test (Mood, 1954) indicate that these differences are statistically
significant. The lower part of the table examines differences between the supraliminal and
subliminal scent group. As indicated, the null for the chocolate is rejected for both tests.
However, both tests fail to reject the null of no difference for the mug at the 5% level.
To check whether the results obtained above hold in the context of conditional analysis
as well as to quantify treatment effects, we estimated random effects regression models
where the grouping structure of the data consists of three levels of nested groups (i.e., three
random effects): the auction group, j, the individual, i, and the auction round, t. The model
specification we estimate is of the form:
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Figure 1: Bids per product and treatment
Figure 2: Bids per product for the Scent treatment by supraliminal/subliminal group
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Table 6: Descriptive statistics of bids per product and treatment
Mug Chocolate
Mean S.D. Median Mean S.D. Median
No cent 2.15 1.83 1.80 1.10 1.02 0.97
Scent 2.95 2.12 2.60 1.57 1.38 1.32
Kruskal-Wallis test χ2 = 69.96, p < 0.001 χ2 = 69.94, p < 0.001
K-sample median test χ2 = 52.57, p < 0.001 χ2 = 52.67, p < 0.001
Scent: Supraliminal 3.05 2.13 2.80 1.90 1.66 1.51
Scent: Subliminal 2.85 2.10 2.50 1.25 0.94 1.00
Kruskal-Wallis test χ2 = 3.36, p = 0.067 χ2 = 42.56, p < 0.001
K-sample median test χ2 = 0.176, p = 0.676 χ2 = 32.83, p < 0.001
Bid∗jit = xjitb+ uj + vji + εjit (7)
where j = 1 . . . J indexes the auction groups, i = i . . . N indexes individuals in an auction
group, t = 1 . . . T indexes auction rounds (in our case J = 32, N = 5 and T = 10) and x
is a vector of independent variables. The random effects, uj, vji and εjit are i.i.d. N(0, σ
2
u),
N(0, σ2v) and N(0, σ
2
ε), respectively and independently of each other.
In addition, about 9.3% of all bids for the mug and 13.5% for the chocolate are exactly
zero. This calls for the use of a censored regression model to address possible censoring from
the left (Tobit model). The Tobit model complicates slightly the analysis since there are four
marginal effect that the researcher might be interested in: a) marginal effects on the latent
variable, ∂E[Bid
∗|x]
∂x
(these are the raw coefficient estimates) b) on the observed variable,
∂E[Bid|x]
∂x
c) on positive bids, ∂E[Bid|Bid>0,x]
∂x
and d) on the probability of being uncensored,
∂Pr[Bid>0|x]
∂x
.
Results (raw coefficient estimates) are exhibited in Table 7 (Table A.1 in Appendix A
shows results with additional demographic and attitudinal variables added in the model
specification). Specifications (1), (3) and (5) show results for the mug, chocolate and a pooled
model respectively, where a treatment dummy (Scent) is added in the model specification.
The scent treatment dummy is positive and statistically significant which is consistent with a
higher WTP under the influence of the olfactory stimuli. Models (2), (4) and (6) replace the
Scent treatment dummy with two dummies: one for the supraliminal scent group and one
for the subliminal scent group (with the no scent treatment serving as the base category).
Table 7 shows that for the mug product, both the supraliminal and subliminal scent
groups exert a positive and statistically significant effect on bids (albeit at the 10% level).
For the chocolate product, there is a similar positive effect for the two groups but it is
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Table 7: Random effects Tobit models
Mug Chocolate Pooled
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant -1.618 -1.617 -0.061 -0.008 0.214 0.215
(2.042) (2.042) (1.442) (1.418) (1.509) (1.504)
Scent 0.840∗ 0.500∗∗ 0.651∗∗
(0.446) (0.241) (0.331)
Scent: Subliminal 0.804∗ 0.215 0.511
(0.475) (0.263) (0.352)
Scent: Supraliminal 0.877∗ 0.793∗∗∗ 0.797∗∗
(0.478) (0.267) (0.355)
Round 0.042∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ -0.006 -0.006 0.017∗∗ 0.017∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Endowment -0.078 -0.078 -0.165 -0.164 -0.179 -0.179
(0.393) (0.393) (0.281) (0.277) (0.304) (0.303)
Hedonic score 0.573∗∗∗ 0.573∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗ 0.411∗∗∗ 0.411∗∗∗
(0.081) (0.081) (0.062) (0.061) (0.023) (0.023)
Chocolate -1.305∗∗∗ -1.305∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.037)
σu 1.086
∗∗∗ 1.085∗∗∗ 0.482∗∗∗ 0.473∗∗∗ 0.786∗∗∗ 0.779∗∗∗
(0.185) (0.185) (0.129) (0.127) (0.141) (0.140)
σv 1.426
∗∗∗ 1.426∗∗∗ 1.052∗∗∗ 1.033∗∗∗ 1.104∗∗∗ 1.101∗∗∗
(0.099) (0.099) (0.074) (0.072) (0.075) (0.075)
σε 0.803
∗∗∗ 0.803∗∗∗ 0.568∗∗∗ 0.568∗∗∗ 1.019∗∗∗ 1.019∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.016) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014)
Observations 1600 1600 1600 1600 3200 3200
Log-likelihood -2081.069 -2081.046 -1557.631 -1554.840 -4560.477 -4559.881
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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statistically significant only for the supraliminal scent group. A Wald test of whether the
coefficients of the supraliminal and the subliminal scent groups are equal rejects the null
for the chocolate (p-value = 0.017). Taken together, our results imply there is a differential
effect of supraliminal and subliminal perception of scent over the food and non-food item.
Given the congruency of the chocolate with the citrus scent in the food dimension, we can
interpret the effect of the scent on chocolate as the result of conscious awareness of the
scent which takes precedence over pleasantness (Olofsson et al., 2012). On the other hand,
given the incongruence of the scent with the mug, the effect for the mug comes through the
pleasantness of the room which doesn’t require a conscious awareness of the scent.
A few other factors that affect bidding behavior are the hedonic score variable which
indicates a positive effect on bidding behavior, with higher bids for subjects that liked more
the respective product. The pooled model indicates a lower valuation for the chocolate with
respect to the mug.
Given that the raw coefficients of Table 7 show the effect on the latent variable, it is more
interesting to examine other marginal effects. Table A.2 in Appendix A shows marginal
effects for models (2) and (4) of Table 7. For example, for the mug, the supraliminal and
the subliminal scent groups have an 8.5% and 8% chance, respectively, of bidding positively
as compared to the no scent group (this refers to the ∂Pr[Bid>0|x]
∂x
labeled column). For the
chocolate product, the supraliminal group has a 14% chance of bidding positively than the
no scent group, while for the subliminal group the effect is not statistically significant.
In addition, in order to get a sense of the economic significance of the estimated marginal
effects, one can interpret marginal changes in terms of the predicted WTP. The average
predicted WTP for the columns labeled ∂E[Bid|x]
∂x
in Table A.2 is e2.56 and e1.36 for the
mug and chocolate, respectively. If we take the estimated marginal effects for the scent
groups for the mug and divide over the average prediction, these effects would correspond to
a 27.09% (=0.694/2.56) and 29.67%(=0.76/2.56) change for the subliminal and supraliminal
group, respectively. For the chocolate, marginal effects as a proportion of predicted WTP
are 12.53%(=0.17/1.36) and 49.16%(=0.667/1.36) for the subliminal and supraliminal group,
respectively. These are all substantial effects.
5.3 Scent effects and risk preferences
Figures 3 and 4 graph the percent of subjects that chose lottery A at any given choice
task. The black dashed line depicts the choices of a risk neutral person assuming a CRRA
utility function and EUT. Deviations from the risk neutral line, in the pattern shown in the
graph, are taken as indications or risk averse behavior. The differences between the lines are
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generally small. When we consider the supraliminal and subliminal scent groups separately,
Figure 4 shows a slightly more risk averse behavior for the subliminal group but an overlap
of lines for the control and the supraliminal group.
(a) Holt and Laury (2002) task (b) Modified task
Figure 3: Percent of subjects choosing the safe choice per treatment group
(a) Holt and Laury (2002) task (b) Modified task
Figure 4: Percent of subjects choosing the safe choice per treatment and supralimi-
nal/subliminal groups
However, as mentioned in Section 4, an analysis of risk choice behavior based only on
the number of safe choices, ignores a significant strand of the literature concerned with
modeling noise in risk choice data. In order to select between the competing stochastic
models and probability weighting functions, we first compared models using Akaike’s and
Bayesian information criteria (AIC and BIC). AIC and BIC do not reveal how well a model
fits the data in an absolute sense, i.e., there is no null hypothesis being tested. Nevertheless,
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these measures offer relative comparisons between models on the basis of information lost
from using a model to represent the (unknown) true model.12
Given that convergence problems may occur as one tries to add covariates to the basic
specification and then end up with specifications with different sets of covariates, we fitted
all models at baseline with no covariates and then calculated AIC and BIC. Table A.3 in
Appendix A shows AIC and BIC measures for all the combinations of error stories and prob-
ability weighting functions. As shown, the Decision Field theory with a logit link shows the
best fit with our data for both decision theories (EUT and RDU). Across all model specifi-
cations estimated with the DFT with logit link, IC measures show that the one parameter
Prelec function should be our choice of a probability weighting function.
Table 8 shows structural estimates where the parameters of interest are modeled with ad-
ditional treatment covariates (Table A.4 in Appendix A shows results where the specification
is augmented with additional demographic and attitudinal variables). Both decision theories
are presented (EUT and RDU) for comparison. We note however, that a test of whether
RDU collapses to EUT (α = 1) is rejected (p < 0.001). Nevertheless, we briefly note that
the EUT specification echoes the results from the graphs. Results from model (1) which uses
only a scent dummy, show no statistical significant association with risk aversion. When we
replace the scent dummy with a supraliminal and a subliminal scent dummy (no scent is the
base outcome; model (2)), we find a statistically significant effect for the subliminal group
but a null effect for the supraliminal group.
Models (3) and (4) show the effect of covariates on r and a, that is the curvature of the
utility function and the curvature of the probability weighting function. With respect to the
curvatures of the probability weighting function, results unambiguously show no effect of any
of the scent dummies. With respect to the curvature of the utility function, when we assume
RDU, the effect of the subliminal group lowers slightly in magnitude and is significant only
at a higher threshold (α = 10%). Table A.4 shows that when we augment this specification
with additional variables, we fail to reject the null of no effect for both the supraliminal and
the subliminal scent groups. Thus, we can conclude that we do not observe a significant
effect of scent on risk aversion, at least not a robust one.
12Drichoutis and Lusk (2016) have shown that AIC and BIC are in agreement with more complex selection
criteria such as Vuong’s test (Vuong, 1989), Clarke’s test (Clarke, 2003) or the out-of-sample log likelihood
(OSLLF) criterion (Norwood et al., 2004).
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Table 8: Estimates for EUT and RDU given the Decision Field theory stochastic assumption
EUT RDU
(1) (2) (3) (4)
r r r α r α
Constant 0.249 0.234 -0.105 -0.394 -0.195 -0.626
(1.019) (1.061) (0.943) (0.671) (0.993) (0.935)
Scent 0.101 0.095 0.006
(0.084) (0.075) (0.022)
Scent: Subliminal 0.190∗∗ 0.171∗ 0.006
(0.093) (0.098) (0.026)
Scent: Supraliminal -0.004 0.011 0.003
(0.119) (0.128) (0.033)
H&L task -0.033 -0.030 -0.453 -0.257 -0.326 -0.149
(0.058) (0.058) (0.407) (0.528) (0.408) (0.397)
Endowment 0.076 0.078 0.178 0.044∗∗∗ 0.178 0.047∗∗
(0.209) (0.217) (0.177) (0.013) (0.188) (0.019)
µ 2.105∗∗∗ 2.114∗∗∗ 3.022∗∗∗ 2.816∗∗∗
(0.152) (0.149) (0.779) (0.681)
Observations 2584 2584 2584 2584
Log-likelihood -1409.574 -1405.859 -1392.407 -1388.677
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
6 Conclusions
We examined the effect of a citrus scent on willingness-to-pay and choice under risk on a
between subjects basis. Our results generally confirm the large literature from the marketing
and psychology fields which indicates that scents may induce consumers in spending more
by increasing their valuation for the product.
We also find a differential effect between a food and a non-food item which we attribute
to the congruency/incongruency of the scent with the product. More specifically, given the
fruity but pleasant nature of the scent which is incongruent with the mug, we find for the
mug that it exerts a similar effect in both the supraliminal and the subliminal scent groups.
This is because the effect of the scent for the non-food item can be attributed to the general
pleasantness of the room despite the incongruence with the product. For the food item, the
scent can be considered congruent, thus it is expected to have an effect on WTP only for
those subjects that are supraliminally aware of the scent.
For the risk choice tasks, we find that the effect of scents on risk aversion is sensitive to
the decision theory one assumes. Under EUT we find a significant effect of the scent on the
curvature of the utility function while statistical significance vanishes under RDU. We find
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no effect of any of the scent dummy variables on the curvature of the probability weighting
function.
Coming back to the casino studies (Hirsch, 1995; Hancock, 2009), based on our null result
it would be tempting to rule out any effect of scents on risk and conclude that increased
revenues in those studies could be attributed to scents altering the pleasantness of rooms
and thus attracting larger groups of people in the slot machine areas. We need a larger
pool of studies to allow for more definite conclusions, so we urge researchers to embark on
a research agenda that will evaluate sensory experiences on economic decision making using
rigorous experimental economics methods.
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A Appendix: Additional tables/figures
Table A.1: Random effects Tobit models (with additional controls)
Mug Chocolate Pooled
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant -3.486 -3.481 -0.978 -0.739 -1.125 -1.053
(2.319) (2.321) (1.656) (1.632) (1.707) (1.705)
Scent 0.818∗ 0.397∗ 0.568∗
(0.443) (0.241) (0.324)
Scent: Subliminal 0.811∗ 0.163 0.475
(0.465) (0.260) (0.342)
Scent: Supralimi-
nal
0.828∗ 0.702∗∗ 0.694∗
(0.484) (0.275) (0.356)
Round 0.042∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ -0.006 -0.006 0.017∗∗ 0.017∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Endowment -0.277 -0.276 -0.430 -0.403 -0.443 -0.433
(0.398) (0.399) (0.281) (0.276) (0.304) (0.303)
Hedonic score 0.586∗∗∗ 0.586∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗ 0.288∗∗∗ 0.413∗∗∗ 0.413∗∗∗
(0.079) (0.079) (0.061) (0.060) (0.023) (0.023)
Chocolate -1.305∗∗∗ -1.305∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.037)
Male -0.215 -0.214 -0.203 -0.192 -0.161 -0.155
(0.249) (0.249) (0.178) (0.175) (0.190) (0.190)
Household size 0.025 0.024 -0.041 -0.046 0.000 -0.002
(0.136) (0.136) (0.095) (0.093) (0.104) (0.103)
Education: 3rd
semester student
0.327 0.326 -0.236 -0.263 0.057 0.048
(0.384) (0.384) (0.259) (0.255) (0.291) (0.291)
Education: 5th
semester student
0.638 0.640 0.001 0.050 0.352 0.380
(0.447) (0.449) (0.301) (0.297) (0.339) (0.340)
Education: 7th
semester student
0.902∗ 0.899∗ 0.281 0.185 0.715∗ 0.676∗
(0.538) (0.542) (0.369) (0.365) (0.409) (0.411)
Education: 9th
semester student
-0.033 -0.037 0.021 -0.082 0.066 0.018
(0.627) (0.632) (0.427) (0.424) (0.477) (0.479)
Education: >9th
semester student
0.703 0.702 0.591 0.552 0.760∗ 0.746∗
(0.528) (0.528) (0.371) (0.365) (0.403) (0.402)
Income: Above av-
erage
0.727∗ 0.728∗ 0.396 0.422 0.581∗ 0.593∗
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(0.411) (0.412) (0.289) (0.284) (0.312) (0.312)
Income: Average 0.439 0.440 0.509∗∗ 0.542∗∗ 0.478∗ 0.495∗
(0.364) (0.365) (0.257) (0.253) (0.276) (0.276)
Income: Below av-
erage
-0.334 -0.333 0.201 0.253 -0.085 -0.064
(0.429) (0.431) (0.303) (0.299) (0.327) (0.327)
Income: Bad or
Very bad
-0.389 -0.388 0.011 0.055 -0.255 -0.233
(0.452) (0.453) (0.324) (0.318) (0.344) (0.344)
Body Mass Index 0.112∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗ 0.054∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.040) (0.028) (0.028) (0.030) (0.030)
Smoking: No 0.421 0.422 0.405 0.419 0.430 0.434
(0.375) (0.375) (0.265) (0.260) (0.288) (0.287)
Smoking: Occa-
sionally
0.420 0.420 0.228 0.238 0.406 0.410
(0.506) (0.506) (0.357) (0.351) (0.386) (0.385)
Auction compre-
hension
-0.091 -0.092 0.054 0.025 -0.015 -0.027
(0.102) (0.104) (0.071) (0.071) (0.077) (0.078)
σu 1.065
∗∗∗ 1.065∗∗∗ 0.483∗∗∗ 0.484∗∗∗ 0.759∗∗∗ 0.758∗∗∗
(0.186) (0.186) (0.125) (0.123) (0.138) (0.138)
σv 1.340
∗∗∗ 1.340∗∗∗ 0.975∗∗∗ 0.956∗∗∗ 1.023∗∗∗ 1.020∗∗∗
(0.094) (0.094) (0.069) (0.068) (0.071) (0.071)
σε 0.804
∗∗∗ 0.804∗∗∗ 0.568∗∗∗ 0.568∗∗∗ 1.019∗∗∗ 1.019∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.016) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014)
Observations 1600 1600 1600 1600 3200 3200
Log-likelihood -2072.354 -2072.353 -1547.532 -1545.013 -4549.733 -4549.375
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Base categories are: No
Scent, Education: 1st semester student, Income: Good or Very good, Smoking: Yes.
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Table A.2: Marginal effects for random effects Tobit models (2) and (4) of Table 7
Mug Chocolate
∂E[Bid|x]
∂x
∂E[Bid|Bid>0,x]
∂x
∂Pr[Bid>0|x]
∂x
∂E[Bid|x]
∂x
∂E[Bid|Bid>0,x]
∂x
∂Pr[Bid>0|x]
∂x
Scent: Subliminal 0.694∗ 0.553∗ 0.080∗ 0.170 0.126 0.046
(0.411) (0.331) (0.047) (0.209) (0.156) (0.056)
Scent: Supraliminal 0.760∗ 0.608∗ 0.085∗ 0.667∗∗∗ 0.516∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗
(0.416) (0.336) (0.047) (0.227) (0.179) (0.046)
Round 0.036∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ -0.005 -0.004 -0.001
(0.006) (0.005) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001)
Endowment -0.067 -0.054 -0.008 -0.133 -0.101 -0.032
(0.338) (0.271) (0.038) (0.224) (0.171) (0.054)
Hedonic score 0.493∗∗∗ 0.396∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.223∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗
(0.067) (0.057) (0.010) (0.047) (0.037) (0.012)
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.3: Akaike and Bayesian Information criteria by error story and model specification
EUT
RDU
Power TK LinLog Prelec
General
Prelec
AIC
Fechner
(Strong utility)
Probit 2945.30 2916.24 2919.10 2916.54 2931.95 2918.23
Logit 2931.01 2913.61 2917.50 2914.01 2922.72 2915.59
Luce
(Strict utility)
2956.76 2931.74 - - 2925.77 2927.50
Contextual
utility
Probit 2865.49 2848.33 2850.89 2843.67 2848.22 2843.93
Logit 2860.20 2846.89 2861.65 2841.71 2846.68 2841.88
Decision Field
theory
Probit 2845.84 2837.98 2816.14 2817.51 2810.14 2811.93
Logit 2827.86† 2825.54† 2810.06† 2811.04† 2805.90† 2807.86†
BIC
Fechner
(Strong utility)
Probit 2957.12 2933.97 2936.83 2940.17 2949.68 2941.86
Logit 2942.83 2931.33 2935.23 2937.64 2940.45 2939.23
Luce
(Strict utility)
2968.57 2949.47 - - 2943.50 2951.18
Contextual
utility
Probit 2877.31 2866.10 2868.6 2867.31 2865.95 2867.57
Logit 2872.01 2864.62 2879.37 2865.35 2864.40 2865.52
Decision Field
theory
Probit 2857.56 2855.55 2833.76 2840.97 2827.71 2835.36
Logit 2839.58† 2843.19† 2827.63† 2834.47† 2823.47† 2831.29†
AIC: Akaike information criterion. BIC: Bayesian information criterion. The dagger (†) indi-
cates column-wise for each information criterion the model which minimizes information lost.
43
Table A.4: Estimates for EUT and RDU given the Decision Field theory stochastic assump-
tion (with additional controls)
EUT RDU
(1) (2) (3) (4)
r r r α r α
Constant 0.640 0.657 0.356 -2.806 0.444 -2.693
(1.018) (1.047) (1.065) (11.621) (1.155) (11.629)
Scent 0.132 0.104 -0.065
(0.090) (0.091) (0.456)
Scent: Subliminal 0.189∗ 0.168 0.072
(0.103) (0.108) (0.466)
Scent: Supralimi-
nal
0.060 0.015 -0.485
(0.120) (0.133) (2.037)
H&L task -0.030 -0.029 -0.302 -1.340 -0.306 -2.162
(0.059) (0.059) (0.521) (4.088) (0.421) (7.052)
Endowment 0.167 0.157 0.230 0.450 0.212 0.641
(0.206) (0.213) (0.190) (1.001) (0.201) (1.416)
Male 0.110 0.105 0.065 -0.053 0.056 -0.126
(0.093) (0.091) (0.116) (0.284) (0.104) (0.536)
Household size 0.003 0.003 0.011 0.024 0.009 0.020
(0.055) (0.054) (0.059) (0.158) (0.056) (0.236)
Education: 3rd
semester student
-0.310∗∗ -0.302∗∗ -0.266∗ -0.130 -0.251∗ -0.140
(0.126) (0.128) (0.153) (0.240) (0.430) (0.574)
Education: 5th
semester student
-0.350∗∗ -0.345∗∗ -0.295∗∗ -0.114 -0.284∗∗ -0.109
(0.146) (0.148) (0.144) (0.226) (0.298) (0.475)
Education: 7th
semester student
-0.395∗∗ -0.363∗∗ -0.244 0.314 -0.171 0.767
(0.160) (0.171) (0.217) (0.383) (1.052) (2.504)
Education: 9th
semester student
-0.366∗∗ -0.347∗∗ -0.099 0.612 -0.070 1.064
(0.172) (0.172) (0.327) (0.513) (1.711) (3.126)
Education: >9th
semester student
-0.460∗∗ -0.438∗∗ -0.374∗ -0.050 -0.338 0.082
(0.219) (0.210) (0.218) (0.397) (0.541) (1.137)
Income: Above av-
erage
-0.063 -0.069 0.062 0.395 0.063 0.670
(0.136) (0.133) (0.154) (1.096) (0.146) (1.898)
Income: Average 0.074 0.070 0.091 0.143 0.089 0.249
(0.119) (0.118) (0.112) (0.563) (0.112) (0.997)
Income: Below av-
erage
0.056 0.042 0.279∗∗ 0.746 0.272∗∗ 1.192
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(0.129) (0.128) (0.132) (1.959) (0.128) (3.129)
Income: Bad or
very bad
0.072 0.065 0.084 0.063 0.070 -0.000
(0.197) (0.194) (0.215) (0.826) (0.204) (1.130)
Body Mass Index -0.028∗ -0.026∗ -0.033∗ -0.053 -0.033∗ -0.093
(0.016) (0.015) (0.018) (0.160) (0.019) (0.305)
Smoking: No -0.024 -0.030 0.003 0.080 -0.005 -0.181
(0.104) (0.105) (0.122) (0.658) (0.127) (1.116)
Smoking: Occa-
sionally
0.019 0.025 0.047 0.152 0.048 0.246
(0.168) (0.183) (0.184) (0.807) (0.206) (1.209)
µ 2.152∗∗∗ 2.154∗∗∗ 2.841∗∗∗ 2.854∗∗∗
(0.152) (0.151) (0.878) (0.719)
Observations 2584 2584 2584 2584
Log-likelihood -1388.589 -1387.081 -1363.766 -1362.273
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Base categories are: No
Scent, Education: 1st semester student, Income: Good or Very good, Smoking: Yes.
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B Appendix: Pictures and other experimental stimuli
(a) Biscuits (b) USB stick
Figure B.1: Picture stimuli used in the training auction rounds
(a) Chocolate with university logo (b) Mug with university logo
Figure B.2: Picture stimuli used in the real auction rounds
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Figure B.3: Risk preference choice task example screen
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(a) Airoma R© XTREME
‘Florida Zest’ by Vectair
Systems (b) Scent dispenser
Figure B.4: Olfactory stimuli and scent dispenser
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Instructions  
[This is a translation of the original instructions written in Greek] 
Welcome to our survey. First of all, I would like to thank you for your presence here, 
today. Before we begin I would like to ask you to turn off or mute you mobile phones 
so that the survey process is not interrupted. Furthermore, you should not 
communicate with other participants until the survey is over, in order to prevent your 
responses being influenced by others. Any attempt to communicate with other 
participants will result in the failure of the survey. During this survey you are going to 
interact with other participants but you will not know with who you are interacting 
with, so that anonymity is preserved.  
If you have any questions during the survey, you can raise your hand and address the 
researcher in private, not in public. We will answer all questions except questions 
concerning the way you should behave during the survey. The reason is that no one, 
including us, can tell you how you should behave since if we knew that, we wouldn’t 
need to conduct this survey today.  
You should know that there are no “right” or “wrong” decisions, nonetheless, choices 
made by you and other participants will affect your final earnings, therefore we advise 
you to pay attention to the instructions you will receive from now on. Every 
participant will receive 4€ as a show-up fee and an additional amount of money 
during the survey; this is money that you will receive at the end of the session. 
Initially I will ask each one of you to pick a three-digit number from a jar. This 
number is strictly personal and unique to each one of you and we will use it for your 
payment. 
 
The survey  
This survey consists of three different stages. In stages one and three you will be 
given the chance to increase your income through short tasks which will be assigned 
to you, while in the second stage you will take part in a series of auctions. After the 
end of the third stage you will be asked to answer a short questionnaire and after 
filling it out you will receive your payment and will be free to leave the lab. More 
detailed instructions for the three stages follow. 
C Appendix: Experimental Instructions
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Stage 1  
In this stage you’ll have to complete a task in which you’ll determine the right 
number of zeros that will appear in a matrix with dimensions 5x5, like the one shown 
below. The table will contain the numbers 0 and 1 and you’ll have 25 seconds to 
count the exact number of zeros that you’ll see on your screen and type the number in 
the box below the matrix. This process will be repeated for 10 times and each time 
the matrix will change. For every correct answer you give, you earn 0.50€ on top of 
your final income. If you give a wrong answer or if you do not respond within the 
time limit, you do not win or lose money. Therefore, if you answer correctly all the 
times, you can earn up to 5€, on top of your participation fees. 
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Stage 2 
In this stage you will be asked to take part in a type of auction known as the 2nd price 
auction. In an auction procedure, several participants submit a bid for a good they 
wish to purchase. The person that provides the highest bid, buys the item. The 
difference is that in a 2nd price auction the person submitting the highest bid 
purchases the product at the second highest bid submitted by another participant. 
Something similar to the above, will take place in Stage 2. The computer will 
randomly split you in groups of 5 people but you will not know who will be the 
members of your group. Afterwards, we will provide you with information and we’ll 
show you one chocolate and one mug for which you are going to submit separate bids 
to purchase them and depending on whether your bid is the highest in your group, you 
will eventually buy or not one of the two products. The process includes the following 
steps: 
1. Description and presentation of products 
2. Bidding for each product separately by all participants 
3. Computer ranks bids from highest to lowest (separately for each group of 5 
persons) 
4. Provide feedback to participants of whether they were the highest bidders or not, 
for each product. 
ATTENTION!! If you bid the highest bid and you are the highest bidder you will 
actually have to BUY the product and the (second largest) bid will be subtracted from 
your final payment. For this reason you should be honest and during the auction offer 
the highest amount of money that each product is worth to you. NOT the price you 
believe that it costs but the maximum price at which you would be willing to buy it if 
it was available in a store.  
If you are not willing to pay any amount 
in order to purchase any of these 
products, you should offer a zero bid. 
The screen you’ll see when you submit 
your bids, looks like the one shown to 
the left. 
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Before the auction, five practice rounds will be performed for some products that are 
not available in the lab and that you are not going to buy. These rounds are made 
solely for familiarizing yourself with the process and will not contribute to your final 
earnings, that is, it is not possible to gain or lose money. 
In the actual auction, ten auction rounds will take place for both products 
simultaneously. 
Depending on yours and other participants’ bids, you could be or not the highest 
bidder of your group, in one or more rounds, for one or both products. For this reason, 
you’ll receive feedback from the computer. At the end of the session, the computer 
will randomly choose one of the two products (mug or chocolate) and one of the ten 
auction rounds as binding. This means that today one and only product will be given 
to the highest bidder of each group. 
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Stage 3 
In this final stage, 20 different screens will be shown. Each screen will give you the 
opportunity to choose between two options. These options are lotteries and will be 
shown in a screen similar to the image below: 
 
Each column represents a lottery where two different monetary amounts are displayed 
and right next to each amount, the respective probability to win the amount is 
displayed. You will have to choose one of the two alternatives shown in the left and in 
the right of your screen by clicking on the corresponding button. You will also have 
the option to indicate indifference between the two options, as shown below. If you 
state indifference for the lotteries, that is, if you state that both lotteries are equally 
likeable, then the computer will randomly select one of the lotteries for you. 
 
 
 
 
The screen will be shown 20 times with different monetary amounts and different 
probabilities assigned to each amount and you will choose between the two different 
lotteries 20 times. 
At the end of Stage 3, each one of you will carry out a random draw in which you will 
randomly pick a number from 1 to 20 and one number from 1 to 100. These numbers 
will determine the binding round in the third stage (one of the 20 screens) and the 
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probability which will determine the amount paid by the lottery you selected in the 
round that was drawn. The additional amount of money from this stage will be added 
to your income and the result will appear on your screen. You can win only one of the 
two amounts that appear on each lottery and only in one of the 20 lottery choices; in 
the one that will be randomly drawn. For this reason you should be very careful and 
make every choice as if it is the one that will be randomly drawn. 
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